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Abstract
This study measures the economic incidence of the hybrid vehicle tax credit implemented
in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. By comparing hybrids to gasoline-powered counterparts as the
credit is phased out and expires, we are able to isolate the impact of the credit on the market
price of hybrid vehicles. We conclude that hybrid prices increase by $0.75 on average for every
additional dollar of credit. Thus, the majority of the subsidy accrues to manufacturers, potentially
encouraging producers to increase the variety and availability of hybrid models on the market.
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Introduction and Background
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 instituted a tax credit for individuals who purchased a
hybrid vehicle after December 31, 2005. Hybrid vehicles are powered by a combination of an
internal combustion engine and electric motors and can achieve fuel efficiency well in excess of
typical cars with a stand-alone gasoline engine. For example, in 2008 the five most fuel efficient
vehicles sold in the United States were all fitted with a hybrid drive train.
Manufacturers wishing to have a vehicle eligible for the tax credit must have it certified
by the Internal Revenue Service, and the amount of the tax credit varies by model and year of the
vehicle depending largely upon the fuel efficiency gains produced by the hybrid vehicle in
comparison to similar non-hybrid models. The maximum allowable credit is $3,400, and in
practice the IRS has certified actual tax credit amounts between $250 and $3,150 with an
average of about $2,000 per vehicle.
The tax credit phases out once a particular manufacturer has sold 60,000 hybrid vehicles
of any year or model. In the quarter the manufacturer sells its 60,000th hybrid car or truck and the
quarter immediately after this, the credit is unchanged. In the subsequent two quarters, the credit
is set at 50% of its previous level, and in the next two quarters the credit is lowered again to 25%
of its original level. The tax credit is eliminated completely in the 6th quarter after the
manufacturer hits the 60,000 vehicle threshold. Toyota reached 60,000 in hybrid sales during the
2nd quarter of 2006, and thus its tax credit began to phase out on October 1, 2006. Honda’s tax
credit began to phase out on January 1, 2008. Other manufacturers, including Ford, General
Motors, and Nissan, had not reached 60,000 in total sales by the third quarter of 2008.
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The statutory incidence of this subsidy is granted to the purchaser of car or truck who is
given a tax credit for the designated amount that may be deducted from their annual individual
income tax. It should be noted that the buyer may not be eligible for the full tax credit if their
total tax liability for the year in question is lower than the amount of the credit (which is
presumably a rare occurrence for purchasers of new cars) or if the buyer is subject to the
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).
The economic incidence of the subsidy, however, may fall on either the manufacturer or
the buyer, regardless of the statutory incidence of the tax credit. Standard economic analysis
states that the economic incidence of a tax (or in this case, a subsidy) is independent of the
statutory incidence and depends on the relative elasticities of the supply and demand of the good.
In a market with a low price elasticity of demand compared to the price elasticity of supply, the
benefits of a subsidy will accrue primarily to suppliers while in a market where the price
elasticity of demand is higher than the price elasticity of supply, consumers will receive the
majority of the benefits of a subsidy.
The relatively large size of the hybrid tax credit along with the discrete nature of the
phase out provides an opportunity to clearly examine the economic incidence of this subsidy.
Several researchers have previously addressed the effectiveness of the Energy Policy Act of
2005 in promoting hybrid adoption. Kahn (2008) notes that hybrid adoption is largely a function
of social preferences and suggests that early adoption, at least, of the technology was primarily
due to non-economic reasons, an idea echoed by Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008). Gallagher
and Muehlegger also note that the effect of income tax credits, which the consumer receives at a
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point in the future, have significantly less impact on sales than credits received at the time of
purchase.
Beresteanu and Li (2008) utilize a panel of vehicle sales in 22 metropolitan statistical
areas to estimate that the average hybrid vehicle subsidy of $2,432 in 2006 as a result of the tax
credits described previously resulted in a 27% to 32% increase in hybrid vehicle sales in that
year. Sallee (2007) examines microlevel sales data on the Toyota Prius, the most popular hybrid
model, and claims that consumers capture $0.975 of every dollar of federal tax credit implying
that the price elasticity of demand must extremely low in comparison to the price elasticity of
supply. Combined with Beresteanu and Li’s assertion that the tax credit resulted in a significant
increase in hybrid sales, the only possible to reconcile these two findings is if supply is highly
elastic while demand is generally inelastic. The finding that demand is inelastic for hybrids,
especially for the distinctly styled Toyota Prius, is corroborated by Beresteanu and Li (2008) as
well as Kahn (2008). However, there is little reason to believe that supply for hybrids is
particularly elastic. Indeed, one of the most common complaints about hybrid vehicles is that
they can be very difficult to find in stock at dealerships. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008)
specifically note that production constraints have limited sales of the Prius and Honda Civic
hybrid several times.
This analysis investigates the economic incidence of hybrid tax credits and, unlike
previous research, finds that for every dollar of tax credit provided by the Energy Policy Act, the
price of hybrid vehicles rose by approximately $0.75 suggesting that manufacturers, not
consumers, were the primary beneficiaries of this subsidy.
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Data and Model
This paper utilizes “True Market Value” (TMV) vehicle pricing price data from
Edmunds.com, a major automotive information website. According to Edmunds.com, the TMV
monthly estimates are calculated based on the vehicle’s invoice price, manufacturer’s suggested
retail price, supply and demand for the vehicle in that month, data on actual vehicle transactions,
current manufacturer-to-dealer incentives and relative brand strength
(http://www.edmunds.com/popupinfo/calculatetmvprices.html).
The data consist of monthly nationwide average market prices for all hybrid vehicle
model years that were both eligible for the tax credit but also subject to the phase out of the
subsidy. Specifically, these data include pricing information for the Toyota Prius (2005-2007),
Toyota Highlander (2006-2007), Toyota Camry (2007), Lexus RX (2006-2007), and the Honda
Civic (2008). Data for both two-wheel drive and all-wheel drive versions were included for the
Highlander and Lexus RX bringing the total number of model years examined to 13. Price data
for identical model year non-hybrid vehicles were also collected. With the exception of the
Toyota Prius, all other hybrid vehicles sold by these companies during the time period in
question were available in a non-hybrid version. In addition to the Edmunds TMV, sale month
and model year, we incorporate monthly gasoline price data obtained from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics’ Average Price Data (U.S. city average per gallon, all gasoline types).
We utilize a difference-in-differences regression framework to isolate the impact of the
credits on the price of hybrid vehicles. This strategy compares the prices of hybrids and nonhybrids, before, during and after the credit phase out. If any of the hybrid subsidy is received by
the seller (i.e. as long as demand is not perfectly inelastic), the credit phase out should result in a
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decrease in the market price of hybrids relative to non-hybrids.
A true difference-in-differences model assumes a treatment and a control group, with
only one group (the treatment group) affected by the policy change in question. In this case,
while only hybrids are directly impacted by the credits (and their corresponding phase-out), it is
possible that the credits will have an indirect impact on non-hybrid prices. Since hybrids and
non-hybrids are potentially substitute goods, a change in the price of hybrids may also impact the
price of their regular gasoline counterparts. As a result, the credits and their phase out may cause
movement in all vehicle prices in our sample and may not simply affect hybrid prices as would
be the case in a standard difference-in-difference model.
We estimate the following equation by OLS:

(1) TMV jt = α 1 hybrid jt + α 2 credit jt * hybrid jt + α 3 credit jt * nonhybrid jt + α 4 gast * hybrid jt
+ α 5 gast * nonhybrid jt + θ j + τ t + h jt + n jt + ε jt .
TMV is the Edmunds.com True Market Value for model j in month t. The hybrid variable is an
indicator equal to 1 if the vehicle is a hybrid and zero otherwise, nonhybrid is equal to 1 if the
vehicle has a regular gas-powered engine, credit is the value of the hybrid vehicle tax credit for
model j in month t, and gas is the average gasoline price in the current month. The equation also
includes fixed effects for the thirteen vehicle models ( θ j ), monthly dummies ( τ t ), and hybrid
and non-hybrid time trends ( h jt , n jt ) capturing the number of months since each model came on
the market. Finally, ε jt is a random error term.
The variable of interest in this equation is α 2 , the coefficient on the interaction between
credit and hybrid. The coefficient α 3 captures the change in the market equilibrium price for
non-hybrids in response to the fact that the credit reduces the hybrid price paid by consumers.
5

Therefore, α 2 represents the additional impact of the credit on hybrids, i.e. the incidence of the
subsidy, provided that no unobservable factors cause further simultaneous movement in the
relative prices of hybrids and non-hybrids. The results from estimating equation (1) are reported
in Table 2.
As expected, the results show that the market price of hybrids rises as a result of the tax
credit. For every additional dollar of credit the average hybrid price increases by $0.75,
indicating that three-quarters of the subsidy is actually collected by producers. This implies that
the true subsidy amount received by consumers ranges from $63 to $788. The sign of the
coefficient on the credit*nonhybrid interaction term is negative but not different from zero at a
10% level of significance. While care should be taken when interpreting coefficients that are not
statistically significant, this result indicates that an extra dollar of credit for hybrid vehicles
results in a $0.46 decrease in the price of non-hybrids. This implies that hybrids and non-hybrids
are indeed substitutes, i.e. demand for non-hybrids falls since the subsidy reduces (by $0.25 for
every dollar of credit) the price consumers pay for hybrids.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The results presented in this paper, unlike those in previous research, suggest that the
economic incidence of the hybrid vehicle tax credit has been received primarily by
manufacturers rather than consumers. This result, however, should not be interpreted as an
indication that the tax credit has been ineffective at promoting the adoption of hybrid vehicles. If
manufacturers capture 75% of the subsidy, as suggested in this paper, then given an average tax
credit of roughly $2,000 per vehicle for the first 60,000 hybrids sold, the hybrid vehicle tax
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credit amounts to at least a $90 million subsidy to each manufacturer as an enticement for
automobile companies to develop hybrid cars and light trucks. Combined with evidence from
Kahn’s (2008) finding that social preferences and not economic reasons are the primary
motivators of early adoption of hybrid technology, a subsidy like the hybrid tax credit that
provides substantial incentives for manufacturers to provide hybrid models in the first place may
be more valuable than subsidies that would simply lower the price of the such vehicles for
consumers once the models are made available.
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Table 1.

Hybrid Vehicle Credit Scheme
Purchase Date

Toyota*

Camry Hybrid

1/1/06 -- 9/30/06

$2,600

10/1/06 --3/31/07

$1,300

4/1/07 -- 9/30/07

$ 650

10/1/2007 and later

$

0

Purchase Date

Toyota*

Prius

1/1/06 -- 9/30/06

$3,150

10/1/06 --3/31/07

$1,575

4/1/07 -- 9/30/07

$787.50

10/1/2007 and later

$

0

Purchase Date
1/1/06 -- 9/30/06

$2,600

Toyota* Highlander Hybrid 2WD and 4WD 10/1/06 --3/31/07

$1,300

4/1/07 -- 9/30/07

$ 650

10/1/2007 and later

$

0

Purchase Date

Lexus*

RX 400h 2WD and 4WD

1/1/06 -- 9/30/06

$2,200

10/1/06 --3/31/07

$1,100

4/1/07 -- 9/30/07

$ 550

10/1/2007 and later

$

0

Purchase Date

Honda**

Civic CVT

Prior to 1/1/08

$2,100

1/1/08 -- 6/30/08

$1,050

7/1/08 -- 12/31/08

$525

1/1/09 and later

$0

Data from http://www.irs.gov
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Table 2.

Impact of Hybrid Tax Credits on Vehicle Prices

Hybrid
Credit*hybrid
Credit*nonhybrid
Prius 2005

Vehicle Price
7,490.175**
(1,129.917)
0.752*
(0.352)
-0.464
(0.363)
13,400.569**
(1,806.327)

Prius 2006

16,326.997**
(1,272.178)

Prius 2007

16,516.954**
(1,000.199)
26,146.816**
(1,393.123)

Highlander 2006 awd
Highlander 2006 fwd
Highlander 2007 awd
Highlander 2007 fwd
Camry 2007
Lexus rx 2006 awd

24,688.195**
(1,384.284)
27,066.043**
(958.791)
25,617.081**
(958.300)
20,759.215**
(1,076.355)
37,476.883**
(1,335.895)

Lexus rx 2006 fwd

35,895.827**
(1,243.801)

Lexus rx 2007 awd

36,199.402**
(977.660)

Lexus rx 2007 fwd

35,151.256**
(998.157)
17,044.729**
(1,129.354)

Civic 2008
Gas*non-hybrid

1,130.550**
(408.379)

Gas*hybrid

-663.288
(446.683)
-188.982**
(57.173)

Non-hybrid trend
Hybrid trend

-7.983
(57.405)

Observations

369

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results from estimating equation (1) by OLS. Regression also includes sale month dummies. Vehicle Price
is Edmunds.com TMV. Prices in Jan 2007 dollars. Hybrid=1 for hybrid vehicles and 0 otherwise. Credit=tax credit amount for vehicle model in
current month. Gas=average U.S. gasoline price in current month. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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